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Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion
Under State Constitutions: A Response to
Employment Division v. Smith
I. INTRODUCTION
Because the Supreme Court's holding in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith "dramatically departs from
well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence"2 with regard to the
Free Exercise Clause,' some state courts view free exercise analysis
under the First Amendment as unpredictable.4 Instead of using
the current First Amendment analysis articulated in Smith to review
free exercise of religion cases, state courts have begun providing
broader free exercise protection by relying solely or independently
on state constitutional free exercise clauses.5
1 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 Id at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). In his dissent in Smith,
Justice Blackmun, with .whom Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, characterized the
holding in Smith as a "wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion
Clauses of our Constitution." Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also First Covenant
Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 187 (Wash. 1992) (stating that Smith "departs
from a long history of established law and adopts a test that places free exercise in a
subordinate, instead of preferred, position"); Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 65
n.3 (Me. 1992) (noting that Smith "abandoned the 'four-stage framework' previously devel-
oped by the United States Supreme Court for First Amendment claims"); Donahue v.
Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 32, 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring)), rehk granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal.
1992).
3 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). The First Amendment has been incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore applies to the states. See Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
For a discussion of free exercise jurisprudence prior to Smith, see infra text accom-
panying notes 7-29. For a discussion of Smith, see infra text accompanying notes 30-39.
4 See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1990) (declining to base its
decision on "the uncertain meaning" of Smith); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn.
1990) (plurality opinion) (noting the "unforeseeable changes in established first
amendment law set forth in recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court;" citing
Smith); First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 185, 187 (citing Hershbage, 462 N.W.2d at 396)
(eschewing the "uncertainty" of Smith).
5 See, eg., Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d at 40; State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178, 179 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1990); Ruper4 605 A.2d at 66 n.3; Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks
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Part II of this Note discussei4the strict scrutiny analysis the
Supreme Court had previously employed in free exercise of reli-
gion cases and Smith's departure from that standard in favor of a
more relaxed standard of review. Part III examines and categorizes
the cases that have afforded greater protection for the free exer-
cise of religion under state constitutions than that provided by the
First Amendment since the Smith case.6 Part IV concludes that the
recent trend of state courts avoiding Smith's narrow reading of the
Free Exercise Clause will continue iii light of the similarity among
state free exercise clauses and the original understanding of those
state provisions. Part IV also lists some states whose future deci-
sions might provide greater free exercise protection under their
state constitutions, based upoifhpr-Smith state precedents that
already have established their respective state free exercise
provisions' independence from, the First Amendment.
II. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first Supreme Court decision to address squarely the Free
Exercise Clause was Reynolds v. United States.7 In Reynolds, the
Court affirmed the conviction of a Mormon charged with biga-
my.' The Court created a belief/action distinction by stating that
while laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opin-
ions, they may with practices."9 The'Court explained that permit-
ting exemptions from laws based on religious conduct such as
engaging in plural marriages Woulde6riable a citizen "to become a
law unto himself.""
Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Mass. 1990); Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 396-97; French, 460
N.W.2d at 8; First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 185-88.
6 See supra note 5.
7 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
8 Id. at 168. In Reynolds, George Reynolds, a member of the Mormon Church,
sought a religious exemption from a federal statute prohibiting polygamy. Id at 145. The
Mormon Church believed that its male members had a duty to practice polygamy and
that failure to do so would result in "damnation in the life to come." Id at 161.
9 Id. at 166.
10 Id at 166-67. The Department of Justice has stated that the belief/action distinc-
tion introduced in Reynolds is contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution,
is inconsistent with the text of the First Amendment, and renders the Free Exercise
Clause as a mere redundancy- "If the free exercise of religion were only a right to ex-
press religious beliefs, then the Free Exercise Clause would add nothing to the First
Amendment, since that right is fully protected by the right to assemble, speak, and pub-
lish." DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT To THE ATiORNEY GENERAL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 19 (1986) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT].
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Cantwell v. Connecticut" signalled the demise of Reynolds'
strict application of the belief/action distinction. In Cantwelg the
Court observed that although the freedom to act according to
one's religion is not absolute, the government only has limited
power to regulate conduct.12
Expressly rejecting the belief/action distinction and establish-
ing the compelling interest test, Sherbert v. Verner s' marks the be-
ginning of modern free exercise analysis under the First Amend-
ment.14 The Court in Sherbert held that South Carolina's denial of
unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who was fired
from her job for refusing to work on Saturdays, her sabbath, vio-
lated her free exercise of religion, 5 Despite the fact that the
Court acknowledged that the state provision, which disqualified
the Sabbatarian from receiving unemployment benefits, regulated
conduct,16 the Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis. 7 The
Court held that any government regulation that substantially bur-
dens a sincere religious practice violates the Free Exercise Clause,
unless the government justifies the burden by a compelling state
interest that is the least restrictive means of achieving that inter-
est.18
Nine years later, the Court in Wisconsin v. Yodet 9 again ap-
plied strict scrutiny analysis to a substantial governmental interfer-
ence with the free exercise of religion. In Yoder, the Court held
11 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
12 Id. at 303-04.
13 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
14 Sherbert is the "first and leading case in the Supreme Court's modem free exercise
jurisprudence." Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Ex-
erds4 103 HARV. L REV. 1409, 1412 (1990).
15 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09.
16 d. at 404.
17 For the purposes of this Note, "strict scrutiny analysis" and "compelling interest
test" are used synonymously.
18 Sherbert 374 U.S. at 403. Commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's mod-
em free exercise jurisprudence for its lack of- any attempt to deternine the original
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Unde-tanding of
the Free Execse Clause and Reigious Diversity,,59 U.M.KC. L. REv. 591, 599, 604-05 (1991)
(asserting that the Court, in Sherbert and subsequent cases, departed from the text of the
Free Exercise Clause and any inquiry as to its original meaning; submitting that denial of
public benefits as a result of religious' beliefs or conduct does not "prohibit"" religion);
McConnell, supra note 14, at 1413 ("le Court made no effort in Sherbert or subsequent
cases to support its holdings through evidence of the historical understanding of 'free
exercise of religion' at the time of the framing and ratification of the first
amendment.").
19 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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that Wisconsin violated the Free Exercise Clause by convicting
members of the Amish religion for violating a generally applicable,
neutral state statute which required children to attend school until
age sixteen.2" High school attendance was contrary to the Amish
faith and their way of life.2 Concluding that Wisconsin's interest
in compulsory education did not outweigh the Amish believers'
free exercise of religion, the Court stated that "only those interests
of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbal-
ance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.
"2
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the applicability of the com-
pelling interest test in free exercise cases in Thomas v. Review Board
of Indiana Employment Security Division.23 In Thomas, the Court held
that Indiana's denial of unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Wit-
ness who refused to transfer to his employer's munitions division
on religious grounds violated the Free Exercise Clause.24 The
Court explained, "The state may justify an inroad on religious
liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest. "25 Although the Supreme Court
created limited exceptions to the applicability of strict scrutiny in
certain free exercise cases, 26 in Hobbie v. Unemployment AppeaLs
20 Id. at 234.
21 Id. at 209.
22 Id. at 215.
23 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
24 Id. at 718.
25 Id.
26 In a military setting, the Court in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986),
denied a Jewish officer of the Air Force a religious exemption from a military regulation.
Id. at 510. Prohibiting the wearing of headgear while indoors, the military regulation
prevented the Jewish officer from wearing his yarmulke as required by his religion. Id. at
505-06. Refusing to apply the strict scrutiny standard, the Court stated, 'Our review of
military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than
constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society." Id. at
507.
The Court also has applied a more deferential standard of review to prison regula-
tions. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the Court held that prison
regulations that prevented Islamic prisoners from attending Muslim services did not vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 353. The regulations "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests--prison security. Id. at 348 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court further limited the applicability of strict scrutiny analysis in free
exercise cases by more narrowly interpreting the word "prohibiting" in the Free Exercise
Clause. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986), the Court held that the Free Exer-
cise Clause did not require the government to provide a religious exemption from the
government's use of social security numbers in administering the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program and the Food Stamp program. A member of the Native
American religion asserted that the government's use of his daughter's social security
number, as a condition for receiving benefits from these programs, robbed his daughter
[Vol. 68:747
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Commission,'7 the Court continued to apply the compelling inter-
est test in cases outside those exceptions. In Hobbie, the Court
held that Florida's denial of unemployment benefits to an individ-
ual who refused to work on her sabbath day violated the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.2" The Court stated that "[b]oth Sherbert and Thomas
held that such infringements -[of the free exercise of religion]
must be subjected to strict scrutiny and [can] be justified only by
proof by the State of a compelling interest. " '
The Smithl case, however, departs from strict scrutiny analy-
sis. In Smith, Oregon denied unemployment benefits to two mem-
of her spirit. Id. at 696-97. The Court found that the use of the daughter's social security
number did not "in any degree impair" the father's free exercise of religion, but merely
involved the way in which the government conducted its internal affairs. Id. at 699-700.
Emphasizing that denying government benefits is far less burdensome than prohibiting or
compelling religious activity, the Court concluded that a condition for governmental ben-
efits does not violate the Free Exercise -Clause if it reasonably promotes a legitimate state
interest. Id. at 703-04, 706-08.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), the
Court examined the government's construction of a road through a portion of a national
forest traditionally used for religious rituals by American Indian tribes. Relying on Eowen's
distinction between regulations involving the way in which the government conducts its
own affairs that incidentally burden religious activity and regulations that prohibit or
compel religious activity, the Court held that the government's construction did not vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 458. It explained that the government's construction
on its own land did not "prohibit" the Indians' free exercise of religion, because it did
not directly or indirectly coerce the Indians to violate their religious beliefs. Id. at 448-51.
27 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
28 Id. at 146.
29 Id. at 141. As recently as 1989, the Supreme Court reiterated the validity of the
compelling interest test in three cases. The Court stated, "rhe free exercise inquiry asks
whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central
religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies
the burden." Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (citing Hobbie, 480
U.S. at 141-42; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-19; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21); see also Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 384 (1990); Frazee v. Illinois
Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
Although the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny review in free exercise cases appears to
support religious liberty, the Court's decisions, by creating exceptions to the application
of the compelling interest test and by broadly interpreting "compelling interest," have
been unsympathetic to those seeking religious exemptions. See supra note 26; see also Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying tax exempt status to a reli-
gious school because of that school's policy against interracial dating and marriage);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (finding the maintenance of the tax system
compelling enough to require a member of the Old Amish Order, a self-supporting reli-
gious group, to pay social security taxes against his religious beliefs). In fact, since the
Court first applied the compelling interest test in 1963, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), is the only case where the Court has granted a religious exemption outside the
context of unemployment compensation.
30 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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hers of the Native American Church. who were fired from their
jobs as drug rehabilitation counselors because they violated
Oregon's criminal narcotics statute by ingesting peyote for sacra-
mental purposes at a religious ceremony."1 Refusing to grant a
constitutionally based religious exemption, the Court held that
Oregon' had not violated the Free Exercise Clause. 2 The signifi-
cance of Smith lies in its analysis and not its outcome, because re-
ligious exemption requests before the Supreme Court were not
usually rewarding..
The Court split five to four on the appropriate test for reli-
gion-based exemptions in free exercise cases. Although Justice
Scalia, writing the majority opinion; 'agreed that a state would
violate the Free Exercise Clause if it sought to prohibit acts only
engaged in for religious purposes,' 4 he stated that a generally
applicable law whose effect incidentally prohibits religion does not
violate the Free Exercise Clause if the law does not intend to
prohibit the free exercise of religion.35 A state must provide a
religion-based exemption to a generally applicable law only in
hybrid situations, where the law infringes another constitutional
protection in conjunction with the free exercise of religion.'
Scalia explained that "the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes).'"37 The majority in Smith then concluded that the com-
pelling interest test does not apply to free exercise challenges to
generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that merely have the
effect of prohibiting a particular religious practice;' otherwise an
individual would be able "'to become a law unto himself.'" 9
31 Id. at 874.
32 Id. at 890.
33 See supra note 26.
34 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
35 I at 878.
36 Id. at 881.
37 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
38 Id. at 884-85, 886 n.3.
39 Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
Scalia's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith expressly contradicts an
earlier interpretation found in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which states:
[T]o agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad
police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protect-
ed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the
[V91. 68:747
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Smith sparked much sch61laly reaction, mostly critical of its
rejection of a constitutionally comfipelled religious exemption and
its abandonment of strict scrutiny analysis for a more deferential
standard of review.' Perhaps because of this reaction, the Court
recently has heard Church of-Lukumi - Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,41 a case that will allow the Court to reconsider or clarify
its holding in Smith.42
power of the State to control, even- under regulations of general applicabili-
ty ....
A regulation neutral on its face may,- in its application, nonetheless offend
the constitutional requirement for governmdntal neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion.
Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
40 See, e.g., James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise.on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91,
9697 (1991) (arguing that Smith mistreated precedent, used unskillful reasoning, and de-
prived the Free Exercise Clause of any independent significance); Kmiec, supra note 18,
at 592-93, 597, 599 (1991) (stating that the Court, in Smith, incorrectly presumed the va-
lidity of laws that have the effect of prohibiting 'religious action, because "some govern-
ment actions which do not intentionally discriminate or are facially neutral can, indeed,
prohibit the exercise of religion contrary to the text of the Constitution"); Douglas
Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Lieny, 60 GEO. WAsH. L REv. 841,
848-49, 855 (1992) (maintaining that because Smith repealed the substantive component
of the Free Exercise Clause," there is no federal constitutional barrier to prevent states
from piersecuting religion); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHt. L REv. 1109, 1111, 1116, 1119, 1128, 1153 (1990) (asserting that the
holding in Smith is contrary to history, text, and precedent, and that its theoretical ratio-
nale is merely the majority's normativejudgments that are inconsistent with the "deep
logic of the First Amendment"). But ef Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions
and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HoF rRA L REV. 245, 247-48, 263-64, 307 (1991)
(agreeing that Smith misinterpreted the Sherbert line of precedents, but asserting that
Smith's rejection of conduct exemptions to neutral laws is consistent with the "plain
meaning" of the Free Exercise Clause); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Raisionism, 58 U. CHI. L REV. 308, 309-10 (1991) (admitting that Smith is incon-
sistent with case precedent but defending Smith's rejection of the Supreme Court's pre-
vious religious exemption analysis, which 'undermines the constitutional values it purports
to protect, is inherently arbitrary, forces courts to engage in a balancing process that
systematically underestimates the state interest, and threatens other constitutional values").
41 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aftd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), cert
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992).
42 In Hialeah, the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye claimed that ordinances passed
by the city of Hialeah, 'Florida, violated its religious freedom under the First Amendment.
Id. at 1469. The church follows the Lukumi religion, commonly know as Santeria, which
sacrifices animals as an integral part of its religious ceremonies. Id. at 1469, 1471. The
city passed ordinances that prevented the practice of animal sacrifice by, among other
things, prohibiting animal slaughter on any premises not zoned for that purpose. Id. at
1476.
The district court held that the ordinances did not impermissibly infringe the
church's religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 1487-88. Finding that
the ordinances were facially neutral regulations that incidentally prohibited the church's
religious conduct, the court determined that the ordinances were justified by compelling
1993]
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III. FREE EXERCISE PROTECTION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS
United States citizens' constitutional rights derive from, and
are dually protected by, both the United States Constitution and
each citizen's state constitution. The United States Constitution
provides minimum guarantees of individual rights by limiting the
powers of the federal and state governments. 43 State constitutions
may supplement the individual rights derived from the federal
constitution by affording their citizens greater protection than the
federal constitution requires. 44 If a ruling by the highest court in
a state squarely and independently relies on its own state constitu-
tion to provide greater protection than the federal constitution,
that decision is final and is immune from review by federal
courts.' Despite the ruling in Smith, therefore, state courts re-
main free to grant state citizens greater free exercise liberties than
those guaranteed in the First Amendment by basing decisions
solely or independently on state constitutions.
In Smith, the majority recognized a state's ability to afford its
citizens broader free exercise protections than those guaranteed
under the federal constitution by acknowledging that three states
secular interests. Id. at 1484, 1487. The district court reasoned that the ordinances pro-
tected the public health by preventing the increased risk of disease that would arise from
the attraction of flies and rats to dead animal carcasses left in public places. Id. at 1474,
1485. The court also explained that the ordinances protected animals from cruelty and
protected children involved in Santeria from emotional injury. Id. at 1485-86.
In an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's ruling. 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991).
43 See Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975). The federal constitution is con-
sidered the "lowest common denominator" of individual rights. Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 136 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44 See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (stating that each
state has the "sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution"); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600, 618-19 (1974); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); see also Wonne Kauger,
ReJlecions on Federalisi.. Protections Afforded by State Constitutions, 27 GoNZ. L REv. 1, 1-2
(1991-92) (characterizing this two-tiered source of protections as "the true' hallmark of
federalism"); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure; State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. UJ. 421, 430 (1974).
45 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117,
126 (1945); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); see also William J. Brennan, Jr.,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L REV. 489, 501 (1977)
(remarking that "the state decisions not only cannot be overturned by, they indeed are
not even reviewable by, the Supreme Court of the United States" and that the Supreme
Court is "utterly without jurisdiction to review such state decisions"); Peter J. Galie, The
Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L REv. 731,
732 (1982).
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exempted religious peyote use from their drug laws.' Justice
O'Connor more clearly accepted a state's ability to afford its citi-
zens greater free exercise protection under state law in the first
part of her concurring opinion, which Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined. These Justices recognized that the Oregon
Supreme Court still could determine that, its state constitution re-
quires Oregon to provide a religious exemption from its generally
applicable criminal prohibition of narcotics for the sacramental
use of peyote.47 Therefore, individuals seeking religiously based
exemptions from generally applicable laws should argue under
both federal and state constitutions in order to obtain their fullest
free exercise protection. '
The ruling in Smith narrowed free exercise protection under
the First Amendment by abandoning the compelling interest test
where individuals seek religiously based exemptions from generally
applicable laws.49 Prior to Smith, most state courts had treated the
federal and state free exercise provisions as identical protections,
or had found it unnecessary to involve the state constitution at
all." Subsequent to Smith, courts in at least five states, by retain-
ing the compelling interest test under their respective state' con-
stitutions, have begun providing greater free exercise protections
than those guaranteed in the First Amendment as interpreted by
Smith.51 These state courts seem to focus on free exercise protec-
46 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890; see Kauger, supra note 44, at 3 n.10 (listing the statutes of
10 states which exempt religious peyote use from criminal prosecution).
47 Smith, 494 U.S. at 892 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In his dissent, Justice
Blackmun noted that 23 states exempt religious peyote use from their drug laws. Id. at
912 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In fact, Blackmun felt that it would not be wise for
the Court to decide the constitutionality of Oregon's criminal prohibition of sacramental
peyote use precisely because the Oregon Supreme Court could, on remand, invalidate the
prohibition under its state constitution. Id. at 909 n.2.
The counterpart to the Free Exercise Clause in the Oregon Constitution states, "All
men shall be secure in the Natural right, to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own consciences." OR. CONST. art. I, § 2. Oregon's constitution also
reads, "No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of
religeous [sic] opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience." OR. CONST. art. I, §
3.
48 In fact, one scholar has asserted that after Smith, an attorney, filing a free exer-
cise claim, commits malpractice if he fails to plead the applicable state constitution as
well as the federal constitution. See Laycock, supra note 40, at 854.
49 See supra text accompanying notes 30.39.
50 See Nicholas P. Miller & Nathan Sheers, Note, Re/igious Free Exercise under State C on-
stitutions, 34 J. CHURCH & ST. 303, 307, 320-21 (1992) (revealing that at least 40 states
prior to Sminth never independently addressed their state free exercise provisions).
51 These state cases are Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal.
1993]
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Rptr.2d 32 (Cal. CL App. 1991), rehg granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992); Rupert v. City of
Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564
N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); First Cove-
nant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). See infra text accompanying
notes 55-135.
Although courts in two other states retained strict scrutiny analysis in free exercise
cases subsequent to Smith, it is unclear whether these courts intended to construe their
respective state free exercise clauses more broadly than the First Amendment. Just one
month after the Supreme Court decided Smith, a Pennsylvania appeals court, in Zummo
v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), applied the compelling interest test and
held that a lower court's order prohibiting a divorced father from taking his children to
Catholic services during visitation periods, contrary to the Jewish mother's faith, violated
the father's free exercise rights. Id at 1157. While specifically citing Smith, the court
stated that state action interfering with religious beliefs "may only be taken in support of
countervailing interests of the highest order, and then only in the least intrusive manner
adequate to safeguard the specific interests identified." Id. at 1135. The court either mis-
applied Smith, distinguished it, or applied strict scrutiny analysis based on Pennsylvania's
constitution.
The most likely answer is that the Pennsylvania court exercised judicial restraint by
implicitly distinguishing Smith to uphold the father's free exercise claim and avoid the
issue as to whether its state constitution grants greater free exercise protection than the
First Amendment Although the court focused on the historical significance of religious
freedom in Pennsylvania, id. at 1133-34, the court made no distinction between its state
and the federal free exercise provisions. Without expressly distinguishing the facts in
Zummo from Smith, the court characterized Zummo as a hybrid situation, involving the
father's parental rights in raising his children as well as his free exercise rights. Id. at
1138. Because Zummo, therefore, qualified as an expressed exception to the holding in
Smith, the court still could have applied the compelling interest test consistent with the
current federal standard.
The second unclear case is State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178 (Kan. Ct App. 1990), in
which a Kansas appellate court, after the ruling in Smith, applied the compelling interest
test under the Kansas Constitution and found a free exercise violation. In Evans, after ap-
pellant pled guilty to charges of rape and unlawful restraint, a judge imposed conditions
of probation requiring appellant to attend a specific church and to perform 1000 hours
of maintenance work at that church. Id. Although the court agreed with appellant's argu-
ment that these probationary conditions violated his free exercise rights under both the
United States Constitution and the Kansas Constitution, the syllabus provided by the
court stated only that the conditions violated the Kansas Constitution. Id. Moreover, the
court's analysis focused solely on the Kansas Constitution. Id at 179-80.
With regard to the free exercise of religion, the Kansas Constitution provides: "The
right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed;
nor shall any person be compelled to attend or support any form of worship; nor shall
any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted." KAN. CONsT.
Bill of Rights, § 7. After quoting this provision, the court in Evans followed one of its
previous cases and determined that "[o]nly those interests of the highest order" can out-
weigh legitimate free exercise of religion claims. Evans, 796 P.2d at 179 (quoting Wright
v. Raines, 571 P.2d 26, 32 (Kan. Ct App. 1977), cert dienite 435 U.S. 933 (1978)). Fur-
ther articulating the appropriate standard to apply, the court stated that a substantial
restriction on the free exercise of religion must be justified by a compelling state interest
with no less restrictive means of achieving that interest available. Id The court in Evans
explained that the Kansas Constitution strongly prohibits religious coercion. Id. at 180.
Concluding that no compelling state interest supported the probationary conditions, the
court ruled that the conditions violated the appellant's free exercise rights under the
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tion under state constitutions, rather than the First Amendment
for two reasons. First, the state courts view free exercise analysis
under the First Amendment as" too uncertain as a result of
Smith, 2 and First Amendment analysis is unnecessary when free
exercise protection may be granted under state constitutions. Sec-
ond, state courts appear to agree that Smith is "incompatible with
our Nation's [and their state's] fundamental commitment to indi-
vidual religious liberty"5 3 and., therefore, feel they must grant
greater free exercise protecion- thafi: Smith provides.
The different bases upon which these state courts relied in
order to assert that their state free exercise clauses granted broad-
er free exercise protectionsftharil the federal counterpart can be
categorized as follows:' pri ai6afe case precedent; state con-
Kansas Constitution. Id. The court in, Evans never mentioned either the First Amendment
or Smith, even though in state cases prior to Smith, the court had discussed the First
Amendment and had made no distinction between the state and federal free exercise
standards. See Wright, 571 P.2d at 31-32, 1
52 See supra text accompanying note 4.
53 Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54 By distinguishing the facts of Smith, some of these state courts also teach that
courts may avoid Smith's relaxed standard of. review without independently relying on
state constitutions. In First Covenant Churd, 840, P,2d at 180-85, the Supreme Court of
Washington applied the compelling interest test urnder the First Amendment by distin-
guishing Smith. The court reasoned that a city ordinance which designated a church as a
landmark was not neutral because it specifically referred to religious facilities. Id. at 180-
81. The ordinance also was not generally applicable because it "invited individualized
assessments of the subject property" and contained "mechanisms for individualized excep-
tions." Id. at 181 (citations omitted).
The court also determined that First Covenant .Church involved a hybrid situation be-
cause the landmark designation violated the church's free -speech rights, as well as its
free exercise rights. Id. at 181-82. It agreed with the church's contention that the
church's architectural design inherently, conveys a Christian message. Id at 182. The
court stated that both the exterior and interior of churches are "'freighted with religious
meaning.'" Id. (quoting Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571,
573 (Mass. 1990)). Finding that the landmark designation substantially burdened the
church's free exercise of religion by requiring city approval of any structural alterations
and by reducing the value of the church's property, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that the city's interest in preserving the church's structure for cultural and aesthetic
purposes was not compelling. Id. at 183, 185. Seattle, therefore, could not justify its land-
mark designation under the First Amendment. Id. at 185.
See also Donahue' v. Fair Employment r Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 32, 40 n.10
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that it would not- base its decision on federal constitutional
grounds but noting that a hybrid situation,arguably existed); State v. Hershberger, 462
N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Minn. 1990) (resting. its decision solely on state constitutional
grounds but indicating that it could distinguish. Smith because the case involved freedom
of association as well as the free exercise of religion).
Finding hybrid situations in future free exercise decisions likely will be an easy task
for state courts. In United States v. IEi~hman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), the Supreme Court
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stitutional text/"peace and safety" clauses; and historical analy-
sis/original meaning. While most of the State cases made no at-
tempt to ascertain the original meaning of their state free exercise
clauses, they relied significantly on state case law and "plain mean-
ing," i.e., the text of their state free exercise provisions.
A. Pre-Smith State Case Precedent
In all five cases, the state courts significantly relied on state
free exercise cases that applied the compelling interest test prior
to Smith. Surprisingly, the pre-Smith case precedents upon which
three of the state courts relied never addressed their state free
exercise provisions independently from the federal standard and
never contained any language that indicated that the state and
federal standards could differ.
The Supreme Court of Washington is one of the three state
courts that based its decision, in part, on pre-Smith case precedents
that never indicated that the two standards could differ. In First
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,55 the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington expressly ruled that its state constitution provided broader
free exercise rights than Smith.56
In First Covenant Church II, Seattle designated the First Cove-
nant Church as an historic landmark, limiting the church's ability
to alter its exterior structure57 One month before the Supreme
Court decided Smith, the Supreme Court of Washington, applying
strict scrutiny analysis, had ruled that the designation violated the
church's free exercise rights under both the United States Consti-
tution and the Washington Constitution."8 After granting certiora-
ri, the Supreme Court, however, vacated the decision and remand-
ed the case to the Supreme Court of Washington "for further
consideration in light of" Smith.59
On remand, the Supreme Court ,of Washington reinstated its
previous holding.' Recognizing that under its state constitution it
confirmed that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects conduct that
communicates a message. Religious activity, by its nature, almost always expresses a mes-
sage filled with religious content.
55 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) [hereinafter First Covenant Church Ii].
56 Id. at 185-86.
57 Id. at 177-78.
58 First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1357-61 (Wash. 1990),
cert. granted and judgnent vacated by City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church, 111 S. Ct.
1097 (1991).
59 City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991).
60 First Covenant Church , 840 P.2d at 177, 189.
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could provide "'individual liberties more expansive than those
conferred by the Federal Constitution,' 61 the court stated that it
would base its decision independently on state constitutional
grounds.62 Contrary to Smith, the court ruled that a neutral, gen-
erally applicable statute that merely indirectly burdens the free
exercise of religion violates Washington's constitutional counter-
part to the Free Exercise Clause, unless the state justifies the stat-
ute with a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved by
less restrictive means.6 Concluding''that Seattle's landmark desig-
nation did not meet these strict standards, the court held that the
landmark ordinance violated the Washington Constitution.64
The Supreme Court of Waihiijton asserted that state case law
prior to Smith supported such'-a broaid interpretation of
Washington's free exercise provision. 65 The case precedents upon
which the court relied state that religious liberty is of "vital impor-
tance" and that it is "the most important dut[y] of our courts to
ever guard . . . religious liberty."66 The aforementioned language,
however, was consistent with the federal free exercise strict scruti-
ny standard that existed prior to Smith. Moreover, all the state case
law that the court discussed or cited in First Covenant Church i
applied the compelling interest test by relying on federal free
exercise cases. None of the state cases were based solely or inde-
pendently on Washington's constitution. Because Washington's
case precedents prior to Smith nevei indicated that its state free
exercise provision had an existence independent from the First
61 Id. at 185 (quoting State v. Gimwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986) (quoting
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980))). In Gunwal, 720 P.2d at
811-13, the Supreme Court of Washington announced its adoption of a "state law first"
philosophy and developed a list of criteria in determining whether it should extend
greater rights under its state constitution than 'the federal constitution: "(1) textual lan-
guage; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law;
(5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local concern." Id. at 811.
62 Id. The court also based its decision on the First Amendment by distinguishing
Smith. See supra note 54.
63 Id. at 187.
64 Id. at 188. In a concurring opinion, Justice Utter would have gone a step further
in establishing the independence of Washington's free exercise jurisprudence by adopting
an original analysis instead of adopting the federally created compelling interest test. Id.
at 191-92 (Utter, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 186 (briefly discussing State ex iL Holcomb v. Armstrong, 239 P.2d 545
(Wash. 1952); Boiling v. Superior Ct., 133 P.2d 803 (Wash. 1943) (rejecting the view that
a majority, through the political process, may control a minority's right to freely exercise
religion)).
66 Bo0ling, 133 P.2d at 807, 809.
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Amendment, the court in First-Covenant Church II asserted the
independence of its state free exercise clause for the first time by
retaining the compelling interest test that once was used coexten-
sively under both federal and state standards.
The second state case, in Which a court applied strict scrutiny
analysis under its state constitution subsequent to Smith by relying
precedent that did not indicate any independence between the
federal and state free exercise standards, is Rupert v. City of Port-
Ian&' The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine applied the compel-
ling interest test in a free exercise case under its state constitution,
while refusing to do so under the First Amendment in light of
Smith because the claimant Was seeking a religious exemption from
a generally applicable law.' In'Rupert, a clergyman of the Native
American Church sought to force the city of Portland to return a
marijuana pipe that police had seized as drug paraphernalia under
Maine's Drug Paraphernalia Act.' The clergyman claimed that
members of the Native American Church view marijuana as sacred
and smoke it as part of their worship.70
Based on the standard of review used in one of its state cases
decided prior to Smith,7 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
applied the compelling interest test under its state free exercise
provisiofi.'2 However, in that previous case, while referring to the
free exercise of religion, the court stated that "the full range of
protection afforded . . . by the Maine Constitution is also available
under the United States Constitution."3 It seems that the court
in Rupert created this apparent inconsistency to establish the inde-
pendence of its state free exercise provision from the First Amend-
ment.
The court then expressly stated that it did not need to deter-
mine whether it would reject Smith's ruling when applying Maine's
Constitution in later free exercise cases.74 It explained that its
conclusion in Rupert would be the same under either standard
because preventing the use and distribution of illegal drugs is a
67 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992).
68 Id. at 63-68.
69 Id at 64 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1111-A (West 1983 & Supp.
1991)).
70 Id at 65.
71 See Blount v. Department of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1379 (Me.
1988).
72 Rupert, 605 A.2d at 66-67.
73 Bount, 551 A.2d at 1385.
74 Ruper, 605 A.2d at 65 n.3.
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compelling state interest, andcMaine's drug law as applied to the
clergyman was the "least restrctiye means" of achieving that inter-
est. 5 The statute, therefore, violated neither the First Amend-
ment nor the Maine Constitution.7
6
The other case in which a-,stte. court broadly interpreted its
state free exercise provision, at least partially based on a pre-Smith
state case that applied the compelling interest test jointly but not
independently under both, federal and state constitutions, is State
v. Hers hberge. 7 The Supreme, Court of Minnesota expressly ruled
that the Minnesota Constitution provides broader free exercise
rights than the First Amendment as interpreted by Smith.'8 In
Hershberger fourteen members,of tle Amish religion were fined for
not complying with a Minnesota,.statute requiring slow-moving
vehicles on public highways to display a bright orange-red trian-
gular emblem.79 The Amish- refused,to, comply with the statute
on religious grounds °  , ,
Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court of Minnesota had ruled
that the state statute, as applied to the Amish, violated the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. The court had expressly declined, therefore, to deter-
mine whether the statute also violated the Minnesota Constitu-
tion."' Although the court had, found that Minnesota supported
the statute with the compelling interest of providing safety on the
public highways, 2 it had concluded that this interest could be
achieved by less restrictive means.8
Just six days after the United States Supreme Court decided
Smith, the Court vacated Hershberger L and remanded the case to
75 Id. at 66-67.
76 Id. at 68.
77 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) [hreinafter'Hershbergf I/].
78 Id. at 396-99.
79 State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282,,284 (Minn. 1989) [hereinafter Hershbegerl]
(citing MINN. STAT. § 169.522- (1988)), Lert granted and judgment vacated Minnesota v.
Hershbergcr, 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
80 Id. The Amish believed that displayinga "loud" color, which they considered to
be a "worldly symbol," on their horse-drawn buggies would contradict one of their princi-
pal religious tenets-that members of the Amish religion should remain separate from
the modem world. Id, see 2 Corinthians 6:14 '("Be ye not unequally yoked together with
unbelievers"); Romans 12:2 ("be not conformed to this world").
81 Hershbergf- , 444 N.W.2d at 284, 289.
82 Id. at 288.
83 Id. at 289. The court noted that requiring the Amish to outline their buggies
with reflective silver tape or to carry red lit lanterns in their buggies would be less re-
strictive alternatives. Id.
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the Supreme Court of Minnesota in light of Smith's holding.8 On
remand, the Supreme Court of Minnesota unanimously refused to
apply the "uncertain meaning" of Smith to the facts of Hershberger
I, determining that its decision could rest independently and ade-
quately on the Minnesota Constitution.'
The Minnesota court retained the strict scrutiny analysis that
it had applied in a free exercise case prior to Smith, even though
the analysis of that previous case was not based on state constitu-
tional grounds.' The Minnesota court ruled that the state stat-
ute, as applied to the Axnish, impaired their free exercise of reli-
gion in violation of the Minnesota Constitution.8' The court ex-
plained that although governmental attempts to preserve peace or
safety are compelling state interests, the government must still use
the least restrictive means to achieve those interests in order to
justify an imposition on religious freedom under the Minnesota
Constitution.' Following its factual finding in Hershberger I, the
court concluded that the state could achieve safety on the public
highways by means that were less restrictive with regard to Amish
religious liberty. 9
84 Minnesota v. Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
85 State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Minn. 1990). The court, however,
indicated that, if necessary, it could distinguish this case from Smith on its facts because
this case involved a hybrid situation. Id. at 396. Explaining that buggies are an important
part of the Amish social life, the court determined that the statute requiring the
flourescent triangular emblem impaired associational freedoms protected by the First
Amendment as well as the free exercise of religion. Id.
86 Id. at 398 (discussing State v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn.
1985)).
87 Id. at 397, 399.
88 Id. at 398-99 (citing State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (plurality por-
tion of opinion, also subsequent to Smith)). In French, a member of the Evangelical Free
Church refused to rent his apartment to an unmarried couple allegedly in violation of a
state statute which prohibited discrimination against individuals because of marital status.
French, 460 N.W.2d at 3. The landlord believed that living together outside of marriage
was sinful. Id In a plurality portion of its opinion, the Supreme Court of Minnesota con-
cluded that even if the landlord had violated the statute, the state must grant the land-
lord an exemption from the statute pursuant to article I, section 16 of the Minnesota
Constitution. Id. at 9, 11. The court refused to deem the landlords actions as licentious
and concluded that less restrictive means were available. Id. at 9-11.
89 Hersher I, 462 N.W.2d at 399. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reaffirmed
the applicability of the strict scrutiny standard to free exercise cases under article I, sec-
tion 16 of the Minnesota Constitution in Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray
High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn.'1992) (listing the four prongs to the compelling
interest test still applicable under the Minnesota Constitution: "whether the objector's
belief is sincerely held; whether the state regulation burdens the exercise of religious be-
liefs; whether the state interest in the regulation is overriding or compelling; and wheth-
er the state regulation uses the least restrictive means").
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Another state court determined that its state free exercise
provision provided greater protection than the First Amendment
subsequent to Smith by relying on pre-Smith state cases that used
the federal and state free exercise standards coextensively, but
contained language establishing the independence of its state free
exercise clause. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in
Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission,' based its decision
solely on its state constitution, expressly providing greater protec-
tion than the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted by Smith. In Soci-
ety of Jesus, after Jesuits began renovating the Church of the Im-
maculate Conception, the Boston Landmarks Commission designat-
ed elements of the church's interior as a landmark.9r
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the
designation violated Massachusetts' free exercise provision.2 The
court reasoned that the landmark designation restrained the Jesu-
its from worshipping according to the dictates of their conscience
because "[tlhe configuration of the church interior is so freighted
with religious meaning that it must be considered part and parcel
of the Jesuits' religious worship." 3 The court simply stated that
Boston's interest in preserving the church's interior for its historic
significance was not compelling enough to justify the burden on
the Jesuits' free exercise of religion under the Massachusetts Con-
stitution. 4 Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
never mentioned the United States Constitution or Smith, the
court's interpretation of article II of its state constitution clearly
provides greater free exercise protection than the First Amend-
ment in light of Smith.
Language in at least one pre-Smith state case, upon which the
court in Society ofJesus relied, supported interpreting Massachusetts'
free exercise clause as requiring strict scrutiny analysis. In 1989,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, although using feder-
al cases to determine the scope of religious liberty under its state
constitution, stated, "it is possible that, in the future, we may con-
clude that there are circumstances in which [our state free exer-
cise provision] provides protection for religious practices not pro-
90 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
91 Id. at 572. The designation required the commission's approval for permanent
alterations to such things as the vestibule, window glazing, organ, organ loft, chancel, and
nave in order to preserve the church's classic mid-nineteenth century design. Id.
92 Id. at 572-73.
93 Id. at 573.
94 Id.
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tected by the First Amendment as construed and applied by Feder-
al courts."9
5
The final case in which a state court ruled that its state con-
stitution provides greater free exercise protection than Smith ex-
pressly relied on the fact that pre-Smith state free exercise cases
applied the compelling interest test independently under both
federal and state constitutions. The Second District Court of Ap-
peal of California in Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Commis-
sion expressly based a free exercise decision solely on its state
constitution.97 In Donahue, Mr. and Mrs. Donahue, who held the
sincere religious belief that fornication or its facilitation is sinful,
refused to rent their apartment to an unmarried couple." The
court of appeal found that the Donahues' refusal to rent to the
unmarried couple constituted marital status discrimination in viola-
tion of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("Act").'
The court, however, applied the compelling interest test under the
California Constitution and concluded that the Donahues were
entitled to a religious exemption from the Act."°
Noting that analysis of free exercise of religion cases is gener-
ally the same under both state and federal constitutional law, the
court of appeal determined that the two standards differed as
applied in Donahue.'' The court explained that although the Su-
preme Court in Smith departed from the compelling interest test
under First Amendment analysis, that standard still applied under
its state constitution.10 2 Stressing that two pre-Smith state free ex-
ercise cases made specific, independent references to the Califor-
nia Constitution as well as to the First Amendment, the court of
appeal concluded that the California Supreme Court had adopted
the federal compelling state interest test prior to Smith as part of
its state constitutional analysis. 05 The court of appeal, therefore,
95 Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1989).
96 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), rehk granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992).
97 Id. at 40 n.10.
98 Id. at 33. The Donahues are Roman Catholics and believe that sexual intercourse
outside of marriage is sinful, and that they would commit a sin if they facilitated forni-
cation by renting an apartment to an unmarried couple. Id. at 33 n.1.
99 Id. at 33, 38 n.5; see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West 1992).
100 Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d at 33, 38, 40, 46.
101 Id. at 39. This determination was significant because California courts have estab-
lished that they must independently determine claims asserted under California's Constitu-
tion. Id. at 39 n.7.
102 Id. at 39.
103 Id. at 40 (citing Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), mot. denied,
490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Walker v. Superior Ct., 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988)).
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.decided that it would continue to apply the compelling interest
test under its state constitution until the California Supreme Court
ruled otherwise."0 4
The court of appeal ruled that no compelling state interest
outweighed the Donahues' free exercise of religion as guaranteed
under the California Constitution."° Finding that the Act, as ap-
plied to the Donahues, substantially burdened their sincere reli-
gious beliefs,"° the court of appeal concluded that California's
interest in protecting unmarried cohabiting couples from marital
discrimination was not a compelling state interest./17 The court
also determined that even though the Act was supported by the
compelling state interest in providing housing, the Act was not the
"least restrictive means" of promoting that interest.1 08
B. State Constitutional Text/"Peace and Safety Clauses"
In determining the scope of state constitutional free exercise
protections, state courts also can be guided by examining the text
of state free exercise provisions and comparing it with the First
Amendment and other state free exercise provisions. Textual anal-
ysis is especially helpful with regard to the free exercise of reli-
gion, because most states have no case law interpreting their own
free exercise provisions."° "Peace and safety" clauses, which limit
the scope of religious liberty by providing that the exercise of re-
ligion may not threaten the public "peace and safety," widely ap-
pear in state free exercise provisions."0 Although "peace and
104 Id. at 40. The court of appeal concluded that the California Supreme Court had
adopted the compelling interest test as part of its state constitution by referencing two
cases decided prior to Smith. The court viewed the California Supreme Court's two refer-
ences to its state constitution in Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988),
where the California Supreme Court applied the compelling interest test in a free exer-
cise case, "as an intention to decide the case not only on First Amendment grounds, but
also on the basis of independent state constitutional grounds." Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d at
40. The court of appeal also noted that the California Supreme Court applied the com-
pelling interest test under both federal and state constitutions in Walker. Donahue, 2 Cal.
Rptr.2d at 40.
105 Id. at 46.
106 Id at 42.
107 Id. at 44-45.
108 Id. at 45.
109 See Miller & Sheers, supra note 50, at 307, 320-21.
110 S&eJusTIcE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 10, at 9, 30 (noting.that "in a major-
ity of the states that ratified the Bill of Rights, 'free exercise' meant that the government
had no right to interfere with religious activities until those activities threatened public
peace and safety or infringed the rights of others"); Miller & Sheers, supra note 50, at
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safety" clauses merely seem to limit religious activity, they impliedly
confirm that generally applicable laws cannot prevent or prohibit
religious activities that do not threaten the public "peace and
safety.""' State courts also may construe "peace and safety" claus-
es as an exclusive limitation on religious liberty, thus limiting the
possible overriding state interests that a court may find in applying
strict scrutiny analysis." 2
All five states, in which the aforementioned state cases held
that their respective state constitutions provide broader free exer-
cise protection than the First Amendment as construed by Smith,
have free exercise provisions that contain "peace and safety" claus-
es. However, only three of those state courts based their ruling at
least in part on the text of their state free exercise provisions.1 13
322 (listing common clauses in state constitutional free exercise provisions); see also
Kmiec, supra note 18, at 600; McConnell, supra note 14, at 1461-62.
111 See McConnell, supra note 40, at 1118 (asking, "If the [state] free exercise guaran-
tees could not be read to exempt believers from 'otherwise valid' laws, what could have
been the purpose of the 'peace and safety' proviso?"); McConnell, supra note 14, at 1462
(stating that "peace and safety" clauses "make sense only if free exercise envisions reli-
giously compelled exemptions from at least some generally applicable laws" because they
"would only have effect if religiously motivated conduct [were permitted to violate] the
general laws in some way").
112 The Department of Justice asserts that limiting the compelling interests (which
outweigh the free exercise of religion if they are the least restrictive means of achieving
those interests) to protecting public safety, peace, and order was a principle adopted by
a majority of the states at the time the First Amendment was ratified. JUSTICE DEPART-
MENT REPORT, supra note 10, at 7-8, 61-62.
113 The Donahue court based its decision solely on article I, section 4 of the Califor-
nia Constitution, which contains a "peace and safety" clause. In part, it provides, "Free
exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed.
77s liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace or
safety of the State." CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added). Although the court of ap-
peal in Donahue ruled that this section provided greater free exercise protection than the
current federal standard, the court did not reach this conclusion by examining how the
language of article I, section 4 differs from the First Amendment. Like the free exercise
clauses in many states, the California Constitution appears to merely limit the scope of
an individual's religious freedom. Reviewing the Donahue case, the Supreme Court of
California, however, easily could follow the reasoning used in First Covenant Church II,
Hershberger, and Society of Jesus and rule that only governmental attempts to protect public
peace or safety or to restrain licentious acts are sufficiently compelling state interests to
justify a substantial burden on religious freedom. See infra notes 114-27 and accompany-
ing text for the above-mentioned cases' treatment of their states' "peace and safety" claus-
es.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63
(Me. 1992), based its decision independently on its state constitution. Id at 63-68. The
Maine Constitution in relevant part states:
All individuals have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no person shall be hurt,
molested or restrained in that person's liberty or estate for worshipping God in
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In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,"4  the Supreme
Court of Washington deemed the textual differences between its
state and the federal free exercise provisions and the inclusion of
a "peace and safety" clause in its state constituion as significant.
Article I, section 11 of the Washington Constitution provides:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious senti-
ment, belief, and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individ-
ual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or
property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state"5
Based on a number of factors, the Washington court concluded
that this section conferred broader free exercise rights than the
United States Constitution. First, the court emphasized that the
language of article I, section 11 significantly differed from, and
was stronger than the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment: "Our state provision 'absolutely' protects freedom of wor-
ship and bars conduct that merely 'disturbs' another on the basis
of religion. Any action that is not licentious or inconsistent with
the 'peace and safety' of the state is 'guaranteed' protection."
11 6
The court in First Covenant Church II, therefore, limited the com-
pelling interests that could override religious activities to govern-
mental attempts to prevent dangers to public peace, health, and
welfare."1
7
The court also stressed the structural differences between the
state and federal consitutions. Whereas the United States Constitu-
the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of that person's own con-
science, nor for that person's religious professions or sentiments, provided that
that person does not distrub the public peace, nor obstruct others in their religious worship;
-and all persons demeaning themselves peaceably, as good members of the
State, shall be equally under the protection of the laws ....
ME. CoNsT. art. I, § 3 (emphasis added). This "peace and safety" clause, however, was
not a factor in the court's decision to depart from the holding in Smith and apply the
compelling interest under this state provision.
In fact, in 1988, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, specifically referring to this
"peace and safety" clause, stated that the clause "cannot be read as giving ess weight to
'compelling public interests' than does the unqualified language of the First Amend-
ment. Blount v. Department of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Me. 1988)
(emphasis in original).
114 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
115 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added).
116 First Covenant Church 1, 840 P.2d at 186.
117 Id.
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tion grants limited power to the federal government, Washington's
constitution allows the state government to do anything not ex-
plicitly forbidden by federal law or the state constitution."8 The
Supreme Court of Washington, therefore, had power to broadly
construe article I, section 11.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts' ruling in Society
of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commission"9 also was based signifi-
cantly on the existence of a "peace and safety" clause in its state
free exercise provision. Article II of the Massachusetts Constitution
in relevant part states:
[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his per-
son, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and
season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or
for his religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not
disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious wor-
ship.'2°
Noting that the language of this section expressly limits the state
interests that are compelling enough to justify governmental im-
position on religious liberty, the court determined that the land-
mark designation of the church's interior was not supported by
any state interest that would immunize it from strict scrutiny un-
der article 11.12' The court explained that renovating the
church's interior neither obstructs religious worship nor disturbs
the public peace.
122
Determining that Minnesota's constitution provides greater
free exercise protection than the First Amendment in State v.
Hershberger,121 the Supreme Court of Minnesota also heavily relied
on the textual differences between its state and the federal free
exercise provisions and the inclusion of a "peace and safety"
clause. The relevant part of article I, section 16 of the Minnesota
Constitution provides:
The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny
or impair others retained by and inherent in the people. The
right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of
118. Id.
119 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
120 MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
121 Id. Absent the limited exceptions under article II, the court characterized article
II as a "categorical prohibition against government restraints on religious worship" and
considered the landmark designation at issue a restraint on religious worship. Id. at 574.
122 Id. at 573-74.
123 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
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his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man
be compelled to attend, erect-or support any place of worship,
or to maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against
his consent; nor shall any control of or interference with the
rights of conscience be permitted; ... but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentious-
ness or justif practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
state .... 124
Emphasizing the textual differences between this section and the
First Amendment, the Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded
that its state constitution provided its citizens with greater free
exercise protections against the government than the United States
Constitution.12 5  The court reasoned that whereas the First
Amendment merely precludes the government from prohibiting
religion, the Minnesota Constitution prevents the government
from interfering with religious freedom.16 Also, unlike the First
Amendment, the Minnesota Constitution exclusively lists and
thereby limits the state interests that may outweigh religious free-
dom. Therefore, under the Minnesota Constitution, only attempts
to prevent licentious acts or to preserve peace or safety are com-
pelling enough to justify government actions which impair the free
exercise of religion.
1 2 7
C. Historical Analysis/Original Meaning
Regardless of one's position on the appropriateness of an
inquiry into original meaning to determine the proper interpreta-
tion of a particular constitutional provision, as Professor
McConnell has stated, "even those Justices and commentators who
124 MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added).
125 Id. at 397. The court further emphasized the importance of religious freedom in
Minnesota by referencing the preamble to Minnesota's constitution, which states: "We, the
people of the state of Minnesota, grateful to God for our civil and religious liberty, and
desiring to perpetuate its blessings and secure the same to ourselves and our posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution." Id at 398.
A couple of months earlier, a plurality of the Supreme Court of Minnesota had
concluded that the Minnesota Constitution "grants far more protection of religious free-
dom than the broad language of the United States Constitution." State v. French, 460
N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990) (plurality portion of the opinion).
126 Hershberger 1, 462 N.W.2d at 397. The court also noted that with regard to the
free exercise of religion, the First Amendment merely restrains governmental action,
whereas the Minnesota Constitution explicitly grants affirmative free exercise rights. Id see
Terrence J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in the Old Miasmal
Mis4," 7 HAMLINE L REv. 51, 67 (1984).
127 Hershberger I2, 462 N.W.2d at 397.
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believe that the historical meaning is not dispositive ordinarily
agree that it is a relevant consideration."128 All five of the state
cases, asserting that their state free exercise provisions afford
greater protection than the First Amendment subsequent to Smith,
had almost no state constitutional free exercise analysis indepen-
dent from the previous federal standard upon which to rely in
order to determine the meaning of their respective state provi-
sions. Despite this fact, four of the five state cases lack any signifi-
cant attempt to consider historical sources as a means of deter-
mining the original meaning of their state free exercise provi-
sions."2 Instead, these state courts assert, rather than discover,
the meaning of their state free exercise clauses based on the lan-
guage of those provisions, on pre-Smith state case law that also
lacked any real consideration of historical sources that might en-
lighten original meaning, or on both.'
Scholars and judges, who have focused on the recent move-
ment of state courts increasing individual rights by relying inde-
pendently on state constitutions, argue that an historical analysis is
an essential element for an independent state constitutional inter-
pretation." The primary need for an adequate, systematic meth-
odology of independent state constitutional interpretation is to
legitimize a divergent interpretation from a previously employed
128 McConnell, supra note 40, at 1117.
129 The only case that legitimately considered historical sources to ascertain the origi-
nal meaning of its state free exercise clause was Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks
Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Mass. 1990). It cited at least three historical sources origi-
nating at the time of or prior to the adoption of Massachusetts' constitutional free exer-
cise clause in 1780.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota at least has attempted to determine the original
meaning of its state free exercise clause by considering some history surrounding that
provision. In State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8-9 (Minn. 1990), the court stressed the
importance of religious liberty based on the language of the preamble to its state consti-
tution and the religious diversity of the early Minnesota settlers. In State v. Hershberger,
462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990), the court again noted the significance of religious
freedom in light of its constitutional preamble.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 55-127.
131 See Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REv. 379, 392 (1980) ("to make an independent argument under the state
clause takes homework-in texts, in history, in alternative approaches to ananlysis"); G.
Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS LJ. 841,
858 (1991) (noting that "if one is to remain faithful to the original understanding of
state constitutions, one must look not only to textual differences between specific state
and federal provisions but also to the broader political and theoretical context from
which the state provisions came"); Robert F. Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing
State Constitutional Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 143, 173 (1986).
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federal analysis by avoiding the appearance of a mere result-orient-
ed reaction to a recent federal case. 32
Ironically, some commentators would say that the aforemen-
tioned state courts' assertions of the meaning of their respective
state free exercise provisions are consistent with the Framers' origi-
nal understanding of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment. 33 This, however, is not surprising, because most current
state free exercise provisions are similar to the majority of those
that have existed since the First Amendment was ratified in
1 7 9 1 ,l" and scholars agree that the First Amendment was mod-
eled after those early state free exercise clauses.3 5 This historical
similarity between the federal Free Exercise Clause and its state
counterparts perhaps explains why at least some of the state courts
132 See Stewart G. Pollock, Address: State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental
Righl, 35 RuTGERS L REV. 707 (1983); David M. Skover, Address: State Constitutional Law
Interpretatim. Out of Lock-Skp" and Beyond "Reactive" Decisionmaking 51 MoNT. L REV. 243,
255-56 (1990) (stating that a true revitalization of state constitutions must move "beyond
the reactive" and create "novel and innovative state law theories of... religious exer-
cise"); Tarr, supra note 131, at 854 (stressing that state courts should avoid "ideological
disagreements with the Supreme Court masquerading as independent interpretations of
state constitutions"); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Reection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Resu/t, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984).
133 See JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 10, at 36, 52, 61-62; Kmiec, supra
note 16, at 601-03 (suggesting that a "peace and safety" exception was not included in
the federal Free Exercise Clause merely because the Framers feared such a clause would
encroach on the police power of the states; stating that only the state's interest in pre-
venting public dangers can override religious liberties under the historical understanding
of the First Amendment); McConnell, supra note 40, at 1118, 1145, 1152 (indicating that
the Free Exercise Clause, in light of its original meaning, requires religious conduct ex-
emptions only subject to limited compelling state interests); McConnell, supra note 14, at
1415, 1453, 1511-12 (asserting that the application of the compelling interest test, even
with regard to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws, is consistent with the
original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause).
134 See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1427, 1455-56, 1458 (noting the similarity among
the free exercise provisions of the early colonies); Miller & Sheers, supra note 50, at 311-
12 (noting the similarities among current state free exercise provisions).
135 See JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 10, at 30, 61-62 (claiming that the
federal Free Exercise Clause reflects the prevailing view of the state free exercise provi-
sions that antedated the First Amendment); McConnell, supra note 14, at 1456, 1460-61,
1485 (stating that "state constitutions provide the most direct evidence of the original
understanding [of the Free Exercise Clause], for it is reasonable to infer that those who
drafted and adopted the first amendment assumed the term 'free exercise of religion'
meant what it had meant in their states" and that "[t]he federal free exercise clause
seems in every respect to have followed the most expansive models among the states");
McConnell, supra note 40, at 1118 (asserting that the state free exercise provisions "were
the likely model for the federal free exercise guarantee, and their evident acknowledg-
ment of free exercise exemptions is the strongest evidence that the framers expected the
First Amendment to enjoy a similarly broad interpretation").
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discussed in this Note emphasized textual differences instead of
original intent to justify their divergent interpretations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the Smith case is so recent, it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah' will overturn Smith expressly or sub silentio by limiting
Smith to its facts. Therefore, the recent trend of state courts that
have avoided Smith's narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause
in the First Amendment and have retained a more heightened
level of scrutiny under their state constitutions will likely continue,
using rationale similar to those state cases analyzed in this Note.
The reasons this trend will likely continue are numerous.
Many other state constitutions have free exercise provisions con-
taining, among other things, "peace and safety" clauses similar to
those in the California, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and
Washington constitutions. If these clauses are given any meaning,
courts should construe them as allowing religious activities that
conflict with generally applicable and neutral as well as invidious
laws, unless the religious actions threaten public safety and peace.
Furthermore, many state free exercise clauses are modeled after
the free exercise provisions that existed in the majority of the
original colonies at the time the First Amendment was ratified.
The history and original meaning of most of these state free exer-
cise provisions support a broader interpretation of those clauses
than the Supreme Court in Smith gave to the First Amend-
ment.""7 Finally, pre-Smith case precedents in a few states, whose
courts have not addressed a free exercise case since Smith, already
have established the independence of their state free exercise pro-
visions and have held that their own state clauses require strict
scrutiny analysis of challenges to the free exercise of religion.'
136 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), afrd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992); see supra note 42.
137 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
138 See Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary and Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589
S.W.2d 877, 879 n.3 (Ky. 1979) (stating that "it is obvious that [our state free exercise
clause] is more restrictive of the power of the state . . . than is the first amendment to
the federal constitution as it has been applied to the states"); In re Brown, 478 So.2d
1033, 1039, 1039 n.5 (Miss. 1985) (expressly basing its free exercise of religion decision
independently on its state constitution and determining that only "compelling consider-
ations of public safety and danger" can outweigh free exercise rights); State v. Pack, 527
S.W.2d 99, 111 (Tenn. 1975) (concluding that its state free exercise clause is "substan-
tially stronger" than the federal Free Exercise Clause and that a "state's interest must be
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Prior to Smith, the federal Free Exercise Clause and almost all
state free exercise provisions granted synonymous religious
protections, subjecting most challenges to the free exercise of
religion to strict scrutiny analysis. Subsequent to Smith, however,
differences between the religious protections under state constitu-
tions and those afforded under the First Amendment are begin-
ning to appear for the first time. Labeling these state decisions as
a trend of state judicial activism in reaction to Smith is misleading.
The state courts merely are retaining an established free exercise
analysis that was discarded by the Supreme Court.
Stuart G. Parsell
compelling" to outweigh religious activities); Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dep't
of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987) (noting that
religious rights under 'the Texas Constitution create a "concomitant zone of privacy" that
"should yield only when the government can demonstrate that an intrusion is reasonably
warranted for the achievement of a compelling governmental objective that can be
achieved by no less intrusive, more reasonable means").

